

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
5 JANUARY 1981

THE INTELLIGENCE WAR SECURITY AGENCY IN PUBLIC EYE

By ROBERT MOSS

THE Chiefs of the National Security Agency decided last week to allow an admitted homosexual to keep a top-security job, provided he told his family the truth about his private life.

Critics of the decision in the Washington intelligence community recall that in 1960, two homosexual NSA employees were found to be members of a Soviet spy ring. Those who defend the decision argue that, in the present case, the officer's vulnerability to blackmail has been reduced because he has been obliged to make a full admission of his proclivities to his family and colleagues.

The scandal has brought the highly-secretive NSA (whose initials have been jokingly said to stand for "Never Say Anything") into the public eye at an interesting moment.

With a budget bigger than that of the CIA and an imposing headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, the NSA handles signals intelligence worldwide (it has a major facility at Menwith Hill, England), code-breaking, and United States communications security.

Interception of domestic telephone calls by the NSA inside the United States came under investigation during the Senate Select Intelligence Committee hearings chaired by Senator Frank Church.

But the NSA has been spared the savage political attacks that have been directed against the CIA and the FBI. Vice-Admiral B. R. ("Bobby") Inman, its highly articulate Director, can claim some measure of credit for this; he has had considerable success in getting the NSA's views across on Capitol Hill.

Adm. Inman has lately been tipped as a possible Deputy Director of the CIA under President-elect Reagan. (Another military man seen as a possible contender for that post is Lieut-Gen. Edward Rowan, the United States military negotiator in the Salt talks in Geneva where he showed healthy scepticism for Soviet promises and a close friend of Gen. Alexander Haig, Mr. Reagan's choice for Secretary of State.)

In recent months, however, the radical lobbies that sought to orchestrate the anti-CIA campaign in America have been visibly shifting their focus towards the NSA. The current issue of the *COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN*, a Washington-based publication closely linked with the CIA defector Mr. Philip Agee (who was deported from Britain and other West European countries as a national security risk because of his links with Cuban and Soviet intelligence operatives) contains a lengthy article on the NSA, most of which takes the form of an interview with an alleged "NSA veteran" who is not named.

Moscow's Armenian

terror expert

NATO intelligence sources believe that Moscow is directly involved in the continuing wave of terrorism against Turkish diplomats and officials by Armenian extremists. As previously reported in this column, scores of Armenian Turks have received guerrilla training at PLO camps in Syria under the supervision of Soviet advisers.

Some Armenian Turks are also believed to have attended training establishments inside the Soviet Union that are controlled by the GRU, Soviet military intelligence, whose Third Department is specifically for handling national liberation movements.

The man behind the overall strategy, according to my sources, is Mr K. N. Brutents, one of the deputy chiefs of the powerful International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, which exercises a decisive co-ordinating role in covert action and subversive operations.

At 56, Mr Brutents is relatively young by comparison with Mr Boris Ponomarev, the 75-year-old head of the International Department, and his 76-year-old immediate superior, Mr R. Ulyanovsky, whose general brief is relations with "national liberation" groups.

Born and educated

Azerbaijani, Mr Brutents is Armenian by nationality whose interests span the Middle East, southern Europe and Latin America. In 1978, after extensive travels in Syria, Lebanon, Venezuela and Colombia, he published a book on the developing countries.

Last year, he returned to Syria and also visited Panama as a member of a Soviet Communist party delegation. In the course of this year, he has had meetings in Moscow with delegations from Nicaragua, Bolivia, Syria and the PLO.

Some observers see him as a possible heir to Mr Ponomarev, although the favoured contender is Mr Vadim Zagladin, who has specialised in efforts to influence the West European member-parties of the Socialist International and to so divide Europe and the United States.

Poland's secret

policeman

HOWEVER the Soviet leadership decides to deal with the continuing workers' revolt in Poland, they can count on a loyal "enforcer" in Gen. Mieczyslaw Moczar, who was brought back into the Warsaw Government as Russian forces stepped up their mobilisation around the country's borders. An authoritative account of Gen. Moczar's leanings (based on his role as Interior Minister under the Gomulka regime, when he exercised direct control over the intelligence service, or Ub) comes from Wladyslaw Tykocinski, a former official of Z-2—the Polish military intelligence service, who defected to the Americans from Berlin in 1965.

Mr Tykocinski says that Moczar is "the chief of the hardliners in the Communist party" which consists of the so-called Partisan group, which means the people who were in the Communist party and units in Poland during the war, and of ex-members of the Stalinist group.

not fight and win any war by defensive means only."

He stresses that by far the most important source of information on terrorist activities is the security authorities' human intelligence. This means agents recruited inside a terrorist organisation (often under a "false flag"), intelligence operatives who are planted there, and the systematic interrogation of captured terrorists.

However, the kind of intelligence needed to prevent a planned terrorist operation from taking place has to be extremely precise (e.g., a bomb will be planted in such-and-such a building at such-and-such an hour) and is extremely difficult to acquire, given the tight compartmentation of terrorist cells.

For this reason, Gen. Gazit expounds the doctrine of a permanent unremitting counter-offensive to attack the leadership, bases and support systems of terrorist groups. He is refreshingly candid in his discussion of covert paramilitary operations.

"Such operations," he states, "are supposed to be designed in such a way as to avoid leaving any marks and evidence as to the attacking force. They will not be formally acknowledged even after the operation has already taken place, even if the evidence left leaves little doubt as to the identity and origins of its performers."

He is equally frank on the need for deception—for example, to mislead terrorists as to the security arrangements for possible targets and psychological warfare against guerrilla groups. The aim of "psywar" operations, he suggests, should be "to hit the terrorist organisation at its most vulnerable spot: the motivation of its members and the readiness of others to join its ranks or to remain and operate within its framework."

(The Gazit paper will appear in *COVERT INTELLIGENCE*, edited by Roy Godson, in the spring. Available from NSIC, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, Washington DC 20036.)